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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES ON Dommsric RELATIONS.
Co. 1936. pp. x, 572. $5.00.

By Frederick L. Kane. St. Paul: West Publishing

In presenting this book Mr. Kane has approached the subject primarily as a
professor. His obvious purpose in publishing this book has been to meet the needs
of the students in the classroom. He has done this in a practical way, rather than
by a broader and more academic treatment of the subject, which characterizes some
of the former case books on Domestic Relations. Such an observation need not
however, be regarded as an unfavorable criticism. There is no evidence in the treatment of the subject either in the selection of cases or the scope of the subject matter
which would indicate that there has been any Sacrifice of scholarliness or thoroughness
in an attempt to be practicaL
Professor Kane has followed in the main the traditional divisions and sequences
that are usually adopted in the study of Domestic Relations and, while in some instances more cases might have been reported as part of the text, an astute appraisal
of the limitation of time in presenting this course, has dictated in these instances,
selection of fewer and more typical cases. These are augmented with citations and
comments which are especially instructive to the student. For instance, in dealing
with the arresting and perplexing question of jurisdiction in marital actions, the
book reports less than a dozen cases. The comments set forth as footnotes on these
cases, however, include pertinent references to twice that number of the leading
cases bearing on the question raised in the reported cases. In addition thereto, opportunity for further research work by the student is afforded and painstakingly
guided by references to several law review articles and sections of the statutes for
a period of ten years and as recently as April 1936.
In addition to the cases reported as the text of the volume, there is also included
in the Appendix the Domestic Relations Law of the State of New York, together with
portions of the Law of Massachusetts and pertinent sections of the New York
Civil Practice Act.
In reference to statutory law, Professor Kane, in submitting his volume, has
carried out what seems to be an innovation in the treatment of this subject from a case
book approach. He has with a few necessary exceptions limited the selection of his
cases to the cases of the jurisdiction in which his students will actually for the most
part be engaged in the practice of law. The only extension of this field is to neighboring States. The cases cited are almost exclusively from New York, New Jersey and the
New England States.
This presents squarely a challenge to the efficacy of the traditional method of
selecting cases decided in every state, for the academic value of their reasoning, as
opposed to a more practical treatment of the subject, in limiting it to a narrower
field. It would seem that where there is a relative uniformity either through the
general following of the Common Law, or through a similarity of statutory enactments, that the former method of careful selection of cases from all the jurisdictions
is a more desirable manner of carrying out the case work method of teaching. The
training of the mind of the law student to a refined, well-rounded capacity for
legal reasoning based on the best expressions of the judiciary throughout the country and throughout our judicial history must be still regarded as the most desirable
method yet prescribed. But where there is a multiplicity of variations and even
virtual contradictions in the statutory laws of the several jurisdictions, it becomes
almost futile to attempt to devise a logical, instructive, educational program of study
based on decisions dealing with these varied and variable laws. It would seem that
the field of Domestic Relations may have reached (and Professor Kane in his In-
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troduction states that this is the fact based on his years of teaching the subject)
throughout the several States a complexity which militates against its being further
regarded as a "Common Law" subject. It would seem that the growth of social
consciousness with the resultant recognition of the vital nature of the problems arising
in the field of Domestic Relations has resulted in a flood of social legislation throughout the States which has brought about codification, in some instances, of the Common
Law doctrines on Domestic Relations and in others of modernizing and elaborating
existing statutes.
In narrowing his scope from the traditional field of all the States however, Professor Kane does not depart from a case system method of teaching. Only as a limit
of the field of selection of cases does his volume reflect a statutory treatment of the
subject. He follows what has been sometimes characterized as a treatment of the
"Common Law of the Statutes".
In selecting his cases Professor Kane has reflected in a slight degree the procedural angle of the subject which would seem to make for interest particularly for
a student who is first approaching the subject. His cases are deliberately selected
from different courts within the jurisdiction, citing at times a decision from a lower
court to bring out the manner in which the problem comes up rather than to cite the
case for its value as substantive law.
This new volume of Cases on Domestic Relations by Professor Kane is a useful,
instructive case book carefully prepared and attractively presented.
STEPHEN S. JACKSON+

HANDBOOK OF ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY.

Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xxiv, 612.

By Max Radin.

St. Paul: West

$5.00.

This is, in many respects, an excellent compendium of English legal history, well
documented. American legal history, however, is slighted, nor is there any way
of finding out such topics of American legal history as are treated, except by reading the book through. Neither the table of contents, nor the index, affords any
aid in this quest.
While the author tells when the accused was allowed the aid of counsel in England, and when counsel acquired the right to cross-examine and to address the
jury, he does not tell us what were the rights of counsel in the colonies. He does
not tell us when the District Attorney came into existence, nor does he inform us
of his ancestry. Yet these are questions in which the reader would naturally be
interested.
His English history is good. He takes up all the conventional topics such as
courts, civil and ecclesiastical, feudal system, royal writs, precedent, the legal profession, and legal literature.
A student who is interested in the topic, might accumulate from the book a list
of customs which would make intelligible the old title: "Lex et Consultudo Anglia,"
though here again the index would not be of much aid to him.
In the same way, and with the same limitation upon the index, the reader might
discover the indebtedness of English to Roman law.
The author writes clearly and explains in very intelligible language obscure points
in English law. It is a book which will be of great value to law students. Its value
would be greatly increased, however, by an adequate index.
JOHN X. PYNE, S.J.
t

Justice of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York.

t Regent, Fordham University, School of Law. Author, ThE MInD (1925).
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TRmAT.SE ON THE LAW or CONTRACTS. By Samuel Williston. Revised Edition,
Volume II. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1936. pp. xi, 927-1723. $8S.00 per
set of 8 volumes.

The original "Williston on Contracts" worked a well-merited chorus of praise. 1
The revision by Williston and Thompson has already given evidence of a crescendo
yet to come.2
This new volume is instantly likable. The dignity of its gold lettering on a rich
red binding immediately inspires a sense of acquisitiveness. This soon blends into
inquisitiveness, which is effectively nurtured and developed by the traditional BakerVoorhis format of large, clear type on friendly, durable paper, with bold-face section.
headings and thoroughly readable footnotes. A salute, in passing, to the proofreader; and the minutie may be left behind.
The subject matter of the second volume is readily discernible from its nine
Chapter Headings:
XIII. Joint Duties and Rights Under Contracts.
XIV. Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons.
XV. Assignment of Contracts.

XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.

Part I
The Statute of Frauds
Scope of Statute. Promise to Answer for the Debt of Another.
Contracts in Consideration of Marriage; Contracts or Sales of Any Interest
in Lands; Contracts Not to Be Performed Within a Year.
Contracts for the Sale of Goods.
Effect of Failing to Comply With Statutory Formalities.
Satisfaction of the Statute by Acceptance and Receipt or Part Payment.
Satisfaction of the Statute by a Memorandum in Writing.

What stimulus to creative thought is here? Let us devote ourselves principally
to the first three topics and relegate the Statute of Frauds to the rear to ruminate
on Life's limitation of time and space.
1. Joint Contracts
The concept of "several" liability is a simple one. So also is that of "joint" duty

or obligation under a contract, which reduces itself to this: that two or more persons
are together bound as if they were a single person. The idea of "joint and several"
1. Corbin, Book Review (1920) 29 YAxn L. J. 942, 945: "No difficult question in contract law should be answered without first consulting Professor Wiliston's work." Cook,
Book Review (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rr~v. 716: " ... the best treatise upon the Anglo-American
law of contracts." Oliphant, Book Review (1921) 19 AMicar. L. REv. 358, 362: "Considered
from almost any angle this is easily the best treatise on the law of contracts in our language
. . . [Professo, Willistons] work abounds in sane and well-matured conclusions richly
rewarding his great industry, patience and thoroughness." Terry, Book Review (1921)
34 HARv. L. Rv. 891, 892, 896: "A monumental treatise on contracts, a treasure house of
the accumulated learning of centuries on the subject, an exhaustive exposition of the
principles which constitute this branch of law, accompanied by a critical analysis of them
running with and through their statement . . . the science of law is advanced and improved by this highly meitorious contribution."
2. Bacon, Book Review of Revised Editon of W wx~rso.x
o,; Co.rnAcrs, vol. 1, S FonoTAt

L. R.Ev. 526, 532: " .

.

. W'liston's Treatise on the Law of Contracts continues to be

the best law book of our times."
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liability, however, is at times confusing. A good example of a "joint" obligation
is that of partners liable upon a partnership contract. A good example of "joint
and several" liability is that of joint tortfeasors.
Joint obligors are necessary parties if alive and within the jurisdiction and objection to their omission from the litigation is seasonably made. "Joint and several"
obligors, on the other hand, are not necessary parties, and one, any or all of them
may be sued by the obligee.
It has been the law that a release of one or more joint obligors discharges the
others and that the same rule is applicable to the joint liability and the several
liability of the joint and several debtors who are "contractually" such, as distinct
from joint tort-feasors. 3
In most of the United States, however, statutes have somewhat changed the common law in regard to joint obligations. Some states have adopted the Uniform
Joint Obligations Act, familiar in New York as Sections 231-240 of the Debtor and
Creditor Law. This Uniform Act alters the law pertaining to the release, without
the express reservation of rights, of fewer than all the co-obligors by extending into
this field, with modifications, the equitable rule of suretyship that a release of a
co-surety releases the other joint or "joint and several" sureties to the extent that
their right of contribution is impaired.
The text under review states that the Uniform Act "governs the rights and duties
'4
of joint tort-feasors as well as of joint contractors." Substantially the same language
appears in the New York statute.
Yet the text also states, with respect to joint tort-feasors, that "a release of one
discharges all."5 And the New York Court of Appeals has squarely held, even
since the adoption of the Uniform Act, that "a general release of one tort-feasor,
made without reservation, creates a bar to an action against another for damages,
arising from the same injury. . . . The law does not permit a double satisfaction
for a single injury." 6
Where, therefore, are we? Does Section 235 of the New York Debtor and Creditor
Law, providing for only a limited release of co-obligors apply to joint tort-feasors
or is it. still the rule, as to them, that a release of one discharges all in toto? The
latter seems to be the law of New York and yet why it should be so is difficult
to understand in view of the express language of the Uniform Act. Scrutiny of the
text has failed to resolve the difficulty.
2. Beneficiaries
Does a Lawrence v. Fox beneficiary ever get a better right than his promisee?
The text after thorough analysis of the rights of a creditor beneficiary, concludes
that "in substance, the right is derivative."' 7 The beneficiary's right is, of course,
limited by the terms of the promise. If there is no valid contract between the
promisor and the promisee, the beneficiary has no rights. So also, if the promise
3. The Restatement of Contracts departs from the older common-law rule that a
release or discharge of one joint and several contractual obligor by act of the creditor,
without reservation or rights against the others, discharges all. It states that the others are
"discharged from their joint duty but not from their several duties, except in the cases
and to the extent required by the law of suretyship." This appears to be a more logical
and more practical point of view, since to the modern mind a release of one debtor
is not necessarily a release or satisfaction of the debt itself.
4. P. 985.
5. P. 994.
6. Milks v. Mclver, 264 N. Y. 267, 190 N. E. 487 (1934).
7. P. 1061.
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is void between the promisor and the promisee for fraud, want of consideration or
failure of consideration. 8 What if there is a valid conditional promise by the promisee, who fails to perform the condition? May the beneficiary perform the condition himself? The text soundly concludes that "Where the condition is not merely
some adventitious occurrence but something which can be brought about by the
beneficiary himself, . . . on the occurrence or performance of the condition the
beneficiary acquires a right of action." 9 The New York case of Gennett v.Smith 0
is not discussed but it was undoubtedly rejected as unsound.
What if the promisee has breached a condition subsequent after the beneficiary's
rights have vested? The problem was suggested in Doll v. Crume"l and Borden v.

Boardman.'2

Should it be governed by the pronouncement of Judge Andrews that

"it would be contrary to justice or good sense to hold that one who comes in by ...
'the privity of substitution' should acquire a better right against the promisor than
the promisee himself had"? 13 The most recent cases suggestive of the answer are
those in which injured persons attempt to recover on liability insurance policies
voluntarily taken out by the insured tort-feasor. If the insured fails to perform
a condition precedent such as "giving immediate notice" of the accident, the beneficiary has no rights. 14 If, however, all conditions precedent are performed and the
beneficiary's rights accrue, the insured and the insurer cannot thereafter deprive him

of such vested rights.' 5 After the injury, for instance, the assured might, by ratification of an unauthorized cancellation of his policy, estop himself from recovering

benefits under his policy; but such ratification would be ineffectual as against the
beneficiary whom he injured.' 6
The quest for situations where a beneficiary gets better rights than his promisee
is intriguing. It will undoubtedly become keener as the law evolves.
3. Assignments
Does an assignee of a chose in action acquire a legal right or an equitable right?
Hot has the battle raged.17 The text adequately discusses the problem. An excel-

8. Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 35-36 (1881).
9. P. 1062: "So it has been held that the beneficialy of a promise to give a lease if a
certain rental was paid, was entitled to recover on tender of the rental."
10. 244 App. Div. 3, 278 N. Y. Supp. 478 (3d Dep't 1935).
11. 41 Neb. 655, 59 N. W. 806 (1894).
12. 157 Mass. 410, 412, 32 N. E. 469, 469 (1892): "The subsequent failure of Collins to
perform his contract would not release the defendant from the obligation if any, which
he had assumed to the plaintiffs...."
13. Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 35 (1881).
14. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367 (1923);
Rushing v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 251 N. Y. 302, 167 N. E. 450 (1929).
15. After an accident, an assured could not agree with his liability insurance company
to cut off the injured man's rights. Rushing v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 251 N.
Y. 302, 167 N. E. 450 (1929).
16. Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, 82 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. Sth
1936); Hooker v. American Indemnity Co., 12 Cal. App. (2d) 67, 54 P. (2d) 1128 (1936).
These two cases are not cited in the text.
17. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 816; Williston,
Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable? (1916) 30 HL~nv. L.
Rv. 97; Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston (1917) 30
HAav. L. Rav. 449; Williston, The Word 'Equitable' and Its Application to the Assignnlent of Choses in Action (1918) 31 Ha.Rv. L. REv. 822.
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lent analysis of the distinction between legal and equitable rights appears in Section
446A. It ends with the following paragraph not found in the old edition:
"For the present purpose, however, the important thing in describing the right
of an assignee is to use words that are likely to cause as little ambiguity as possible.
Partly in spite of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs and partly in
view of its, equitable ownership and equitable right have a perfectly definite meaning
-namely, an ownership or a right good against one person primarily, and also good
against both the. possessor of a later equitable right and the possessor of a later
legal right acquired gratuitously or with notice of the equity. The statement that
an assignee has a legal right or a legal title, though generally true as far as the procedure is concerned, surely tends to, and actually in some instances has induced the
belief that the assignee's rights are more extended than is or ought to be the case.
The use of the word "equitable" on the other hand, unfortunate as the different
meanings of the word are, will not cause anyone to believe that a bill in equity is
the necessary means of enforcing an assignee's right, and when the word has been
used it has not caused doubt as to what are the substantive jural relations of the
parties."
The conclusion is therefore drawn, at page 1305, that "the assignee's rights should
still be regarded in the sense of being governed and defined by the principles originally
established by the courts of equity."
The discussion might have been enhanced by a consideration of Superior Brassiere
Co. Inc. v. Zimetbaum s and Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co.10
Where there are successive assignments of a chose in action and the second assignee
has been paid by the debtor, the legal phenomenon which permits the first assignee
to recover from the second assignee is, of course, indicative of higher "rights" in
the latter. Are they legal or equitable? Does the first assignee prevail because
he has a better legal right or a higher equity? The question itself suggests the
possibilities for discussion.
So much for the present. No gold mine of any consequence was ever exhausted
in a day. The revised Williston is a gold mine of great worth. Professor Thompson
has brought to the revision a fresh kdenness, an aptness of citation and an unerring
accuracy. It is small wonder that Williston himself became fascinated by the new
brilliance of his old gem and soon warmed to the task of perfecting perfection.
This is not a rehash of any old dish. It is a thorough revision and almost a new
work. The combination of Williston's thoroughness of analysis, depth of experience and facility of expression with Thompson's diligence of application, relentless
energy and unbounded enthusiasm for contractual concepts has served to produce
a treatise as nearly perfect as human hands can mould.
JOHN F. X. FiNN.f

CAsEs ON PUBLIC UTILrIEs. By Young B. Smith, Noel T. Dowling and Robert L.
Hale. (Second edition). St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xl, 1107.

$6.50.
This second edition of a well-known casebook on public utilities is the largest of
new casebooks in this field. The editors point out that it is one hundred pages
shorter than in its first edition. The cases are arranged with excellent regard for
historical development but without neglecting the possibility of an analytical arrangement at the same time. The use of introductory notes and extracts from arti18.

214

App. Div.

525, 212

N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1925).

19. 264 U. S. 182, 197 (1924).
f

Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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des, at some length, is generous. The opening chapter deals with the traditional
theory of businesses affected with a public interest and has the following order of
arrangement:
1. Introductory Note on Public Utilities at Common Law
2. Regulation by Affirmative Legislative Action
(a) Company's Claim to Freedom from Regulation as a Public Utility
(1) On the Ground of No Public Interest
(2) On the Ground of No Public Profession
(b) Company's Claim that Regulation Shall Not Be Confiscatory
3. Regulation by Contracts and Conditions Attached to Privileges
In this first chapter you have the landmark cases of Mumn v. Illinois,' Brass v.
North Dakota,2 Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations,3 Ribnh
v. McBride4 and such modems as New 7State Ice Company v. Liebmann,3 Nebbia v.
6
New York and Stephenson v. Binford.
The editing of the opinions has been carefully done with a regard for proper
balance between court and dissenting opinions. In the Licbmann case,8 Mr. Justice
Brandeis' dissenting opinion, for example, is given very full space so that both
the economic discussion and the brilliant appeal for state experiments are included.
It is to be regretted that the editors did not also include his original notes to the
part of the opinion they have printed. On the other hand the equally powerful
dissent on the other side of the economic battlefield in an earlier case, Budd v. New
York,9 is printed so that the full picture of court development can be seen. And in
the Nebbia casel0 you find the same fair apportionment of space between the majority and minority opinions.
Chapter two begins with the closely allied topics, "Competition and Monopoly,"
taking up restraints and the granting of certificates of public convenience and necessity. Only court opinions are used, thereby giving the authoritative source, and there
is a liberal use of state court decisions in this important field of state policy. The
reviewer's preference for court rather than commission decisions seems vindicated
in the selection of cases given here.
Chapter three deals with "Service and Facilities," properly begins with "Suspension
or Abandonment of Service" and then in brief space covers "Duty to Serve, ' "Expansion of Pacilities," "Connecting Service," "Subsidiary Service," "Service to Intermediaries" and "Collateral Business," taking for those topics only 130 pages.
Chapter four is on "Cost Plus Fair Return as the Test of Rate Levels." It opens
with an introduction to Smyth v. Atnes," showing the origin of judicial intervention to prevent "taking" property without compensation. That introduction is
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company.'2 Smyth v. Anes is followed by a
series of useful notes on reasonableness, property taken for public use, and physical,
1. Mlunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1894).
3. Wolf! Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
4. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
6. Nebbia. v. New York- 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
7. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 (1932).
S. See note 5 supra.
9. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517 (1892).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
12. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
2.
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as distinct from intangible, values. Next we have the realistic study of the fair
rate of return, with reference to the need of raising funds, beginning with the astonla
ishing case of United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West. Only
from
the disand
a
note
the rate of return section is published here in a short extract,
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in this case. There is, however, a valuable
presentation of the financial situation in the same case in an editorial note. Next there
is a Connecticut commission opinion indicating a somewhat more realistic result. The
discussion of actual costs and reproduction costs is presented in the following classic
cases: Minnesota Rate Cases;14 Missouri, ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri;15 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Company,10 the O'Fallon case;' 7 an extract from a dissent of Commissioner East9
man;18 the Los Angeles Gas and Electric case;1 a note by Mr. Hale analyzing the
20
Company case,21 and finally, the
and
Light
Power
and
the
Dayton
case
Lindheimer
last major attempt to clarify the situation, West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone
Company.22 In nearly all, the dissenting opinions are given, especially the brilliant
23
dissent$ of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company case,
and the O'Fallon case,2 4 and the dissent of Mr. Justice Stone in the Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone case. 25 The Southwestern Bell case is used twice, its text actually
appearing in the beginning of another section headed, "Articulate Discussions of
Premises, Replacement Cost v. Actual Cost." Its extremely valuable notes to the
dissenting opinion appear to be fully used. It is followed by a series of short extracts from state court and commission opinions as well as extracts from several
law review articles. There are also similar extracts discussing security issues as a
rate base, differentiation between investments made before and after announcement
of regulatory policy and incentives to efficiency. There are separate sections on the
intangible values, such as franchises, good will, going value and accrued deficits.
There is a special section which deals with reservations and surpluses, another with
depreciation, including in this latter portions of the majority and dissenting opinions
20
in the United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West, and the
27
opinion of the court in the Lindheimer case, but only a short extract from the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Butler. The chapter concludes a very complete
survey with the section "Operating Expenses." That section is made up of an
13. United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 (1930).
14. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913).
15. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
16. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
17. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929).
18. Commissioner Eastman dissenting in Re San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co.,
75 I. C. C. 463 (1923).
19. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U.
S.287 (1933).
20. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934).
21. Dayton Power and Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S.
290 (1934).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

West v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. S. 662 (1935).
See note 15 supra.
See note 17 supra.
See note 22 supra.
See note 13 supra.
See note 20 supra.
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extract from the opinion of the court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephon2 and an

annotation to that case by the editors.
Chapter 5 takes up "Standards for Individual Rates." The first section deals
with specific services. Next the costs and profits of those operations not subject to
regulation, and their effect upon the regulative business, are considered in a series
of court and commission opinions. The very difficult question of cost apportionment
has a section composed of notes and two annotations. The exposition of just and
reasonable rates, with reference to value of the service as a factor, has a note and
extracts from law reviews.
Chapter 6, "Discrimination," deals first with discrimination at common law and
under statutes. This is a well extended section with many illustrations from Federal
and state court decisions and occupies 44 pages. The next section deals with special
grounds for discrimination, for example, rates low relative to costs, including the
famous Interrountain Rate cases,20 and rates high relative to costs, using the recent Great Northern Utilities case 3" and the Mississippi.Valley Barge Line case.31
An interesting annotation comes under a sub-division (c) on reasonable earnings
dealing with rationing of service, including,
from reasonable rates. Next is a section
32
among others, the Assigned Car cases.
Chapter 7 deals with the question of 'Liability of Utilities" and opens with a
general section filling 44 pages. Liability as an insurer takes another 40 pages and
exceptions to liability as insurer about 27 pages. Section 4 of the chapter, inception
and termination of insurer's liability, has 38 pages. Section. 5 deals with liability
of connecting carriers. Section 6 on limit of liability at common law; and under
statute, such as the Interstate Commerce Act, concludes the chapter, which, in its
entirety, takes 290 pages and is the longest chapter in the book.
The final chapter, 8, deals with "Functions of Commissions and Courts in the
Regulatory Process" and opens with limitations to court jurisdiction. In this section are groups of cases on initial recourse to administrative agencies (including the
Prentis case) 33 and the question of negative orders of the Interstate Commerce

Commission, the difficult Proctor and Gamble case 34 on this point being followed

by a special note. Another section deals with notice and hearing in administrative proceedings and has only the brief Southern Railway v. Virginia caseas and two short
notes, one on hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, the other on
the power of the Commission to compel the production of evidence, both useful annotations. Reparation awards are dealt with in two cases, and the final section of
the chapter, and of the book, judicial review of administrative action, has only the
30
three standard cases, i.e., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pa. R. R. Co.
37
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., and, finally the Ben
3

Avon case. 8

It is to be regretted that, in view of the excellence of this book, the final section
28. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
29. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914).
30. Public Service Commission of Montana v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S.
130 (1933).
31. Mississippi Viley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282 (1934).
32. Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927).
33. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1903).
34. Proctor and Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912).
35. Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 (1933).
36.

222 U. S. 541 (1912).

37. 216 U. S. 538 (1910).
38. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
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of the last chapter is not given more complete treatment. From the dates of the
publication, one sees that the book was published before the St. Joseph's Stock Yard
opinion 39 became available, and, if this last section is in a new edition, one feels sure
the editors will have to include that case. The omission of other cases on this last
topic is probably because of the editors' feeling that it is a problem for more extensive treatment in courses on administrative law and constitutional law. In view
of'the complaint of teachers of constitutional law that e,erybody is teaching it
under the guise of special courses, it is perhaps a wise self-limitation on the part of
the editors here, to restrict this final chapter as they have.
The book is very attractively printed. More of the original case notes would, for
this reviewer, give the opinions greater utility, even though it might cut down the
number of opinions that could be printed. There is a very excellent table of contents, which not only includes the chapter sub-divisions but indicates the cases and
notes taken up under each of these sub-divisions. There is, in addition, a complete
table of cases and, at the back of the book, a very good general index. The modem
practice of publishing special tables of law review articles used, would increase to
considerable degree the value of the indices in this book, particularly because the
editors have given those articles a status often equal to that of the court opinions.
Never having used the book in class, this reviewer cannot give a very strong
opinion as to its utility for that purpose, but the arrangement appears to be thoroughly
suited for teaching and classroom discussion. Although over-long for a one semester
course, the use, as far as time permits, of the first sections of the book should provide most stimulating classes.
If additional chapters were possible, this reviewer would like one on Intercorporate
Relations
and one on Government Operation and Ownership, including the T.V.A.
40
case.

J. F. DAviSONt

THE ARK AND THE Dove. The Beginning of Civil and Religious Liberties in America.
By J. Moss Ives. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1936. pp. xi, 435.
$3.50.
This book which deals primarily with the Maryland settlement and its significance
in American history comes as a much needed challenge to currently "received ideas"
about our Constitution and the traditional principles upon which it is founded. As
the author himself states by way of summary in his concluding chapter:
A studied analysis of the antecedents of Maryland liberties, which are to a great

extent synonymous with American liberties, gives results somewhat upsetting to many
preconceived ideas and prevalent notions. Such an analysis will reveal a thread of
influence that goes back of the Protestant Reformation back of the Magna Charta,
to the cloisters of the Middle Ages and to the ancient Schoolmen whose system
of social and political philosophy found reinterpretation by Jesuit scholars in the
days of the Renaissance and later, when English monarchs invoked the doctrine of
the divine right of kings. This same thread of influence is discernible in the Balti-

more policies of government and may then be traced through the dark days following
the Revolution of 1688 to the very doors of the Constitutional Convention and the
First Congress of the United States.'
39. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
40. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
t Assistant Professor of Law, George Washington University, School of Law.
1.

P. 417.
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In other words the author's contention, which he sustains on strictly historical
grounds, is that our Constitution in its most distinctive features is based on principles that derive traditionally in true ungarbled form from St. Augustine, St. Thomas,
St. Robert Bellarmine, and Suarez. But this does not give the full measure of
originality and importance of the book. Others to whom he amply refers, had
called attention to the identity in principle of the teaching of these earlier Medieval
and Scholastic philosophers and of the theory relied on by the leading minds among
those who wrought at the initial framing and early interpretation of the Constitution. It remained for Judge Ives, in his most telling contribution, to establish,
on the basis of thoroughly sound historical evidence, the de facto connecting link
between that earlier teaching and the more fully intelligible theory presupposed and
implicit in the very nature of our Constitution. This he does by presenting for the
first time a true and adequate account of the part played by such logical heirs of
that earlier tradition as Charles Carroll of Carrolton, John Carroll and (Judge
Ives' very special discovery) Daniel Carroll, who, as a member of the Federal Convention, worked in conjunction with James Wilson and, as a representative in the House
of the first Congress, is responsible for the present wording of the Tenth Amendment wherein power is reserved not only to the States but "to the people." As this
last is peculiarly Suarezian in its implications we might adduce the words of William
Hard, who in an article in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science for May 1936, entitled The Spirit of the Constitution, gives a very
apt summary of Judge Ives' chapter on this point. Treating of the doctrine of the
sovereignty of the people as conventionally settled in our Federal Constitution he
2
says:
That doctrine cannot be eradicated from the Constitution of the United States
without destroying not merely its body but its spirit too. It is a doctrine which in
the seventeenth century the Italian theologian Bellarmine stated in the words, "The
people never so transfer their power to the King as not to retain habitual power in
their own hands." And at about the same time the Spanish theologian, Suarez, similarly said that the people, if they so please, (Italics ours. It is this and the scholastic doctrine of natural law that distinguishes Suarez from Rousseau) "retain the
supreme governmental power in themselves, not having transferred it to any
Prince." But this is nothing but "the sovereignty of the people," implying and even
necessitating a system of "delegated powers" and "reserved rights."
Such speculations originated in the halls of the theologians of Europe. They
grew to constitutional embodiments in the halls of statesmen on these shores. James
Wilson, one of the central luminaries of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
denied that Blackstone was right in defining law as a "rule of action prescribed by
some superior which the inferior is bound to obey." He said that the origin of
human law is in the people. He said that the idea of a superior in the field of
human law is "unnecessary, unfounded and dangerous."
That same desire to strip the state of all attributions of primary "superiority"
was evidenced when the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was resolved upon by
the Congress, in 1789. As originally reported to the House of Representatives, that
amendment stated that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively." The House of Representatives carefully added the words "or to the people."
It wished no misunderstanding. The Constitution perfected by our Revolutionary
forefathers, consisting of seven articles and ten amendments, might have begun with
the words "We the States" and might have ended With the words "the States respectively." It in fact began and begins with the words "We the people" and ended
and ends with the words "or to the people."
2.

(1936)

185 A- ,xALs 12, 13.
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All this will sound like news to the many and not very "popular" news at that. To
our historians and political scientists and perhaps to most lawyers it will be anathema
in spite of whatever pride they may take in what they assume to be their own
"open mindedness." Yet the only reason for such an attitude is that this is not
what they have been led to believe. Their own position as to the theory of the
Constitution is based on nothing more solid than a kind of onditology. They have
seen it written and heard it said so often that it all derives from the Mayflower
Compact and the contractual theory of the New England churches or from Milton
or Locke or Rousseau, etc. As a result they have never even asked themselves
whether such assumptions made sense when tested critically and on a truly searching analysis both of what the Constitution itself implies and of what the leading
framers of the instrument really had in mind in the way of definite, coherent principles when they undertook to organize it into the complex whole which we know
and subsequently, to interpret it, when ratified, as a going concern or living thing.
In respect to all contractual theories outside of the medieval and sound scholastic
tradition the very same may be said which C. E. Vaughan has noted in regard to
Locke and Rousseau. Of the first he says "To Locke-still more to later individualists-politics are entirely divorced from morals, or indeed from any spiritual need
of man. The individual leads his life-moral, religious and intellectual-wholly to
himself." While as to Rousseau he points out that "we have it from Rousseau's
own lips that, at the time when the Contract is made, man is entirely lacking in
all that constitutes the moral sense. And that can only mean that he is incapable
of recognizing any moral obligation. The moral sanction, therefore, falls to the
ground, as that of brute force had done before it. And the Contract is left with
no sanction whatsoever. It might just as well have never been made."3 How far
this falls short of what was originally taken to be presupposed in our Constitution can
readily be gauged from Washington's Farewell Address, where, in the words of
Hamilton who wrote the original draft he reminds us how
"This government, the offspring of your own choice, uninfluenced and unawed,
adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing
within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence
and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence
in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty.
The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter
their Constitution of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists,
'till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish
government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government."
Wilson's estimate of Locke and the dangerous ambiguities of Locke's thought
may be gathered from his statement 4 that "I am equally far from believing that
Mr. Locke was a friend to infidelity. But yet it is unquestionable, that the writings
of Mr. Locke have facilitated the progress, and have given strength to the effects
of scepticism." Moreover, when dealing with the subject of the source of obligation of human law Wilson not only rejects Blackstone's definition but those of
Grotius, Puffendorff, Heineccius, Burlamaqui and others as well, his own position
being, as we have seen, more strictly in line with that of Suarez. Again, Madison,
in a letter to Jefferson, with reference to a textbook for law schools declared:
"It is certainly very material that the true doctrines of liberty, as exemplified in
1 VAUGHN, TnE Poucri.rWz rns oF JEAN JAcQuEs RoussEAu (1915) 40, 43.
4. R. G. ADAms, SELr.crD Po~ncAL EssAys or JAxs WilsoN (1930) 226.
3.
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our political system, should be inculcated on those who are to sustain and administer it. It is at the same time not easy to find standard books that will be both
guides and guards for the purpose. Sidney and Locke are admirably calculated
to impress on young minds the right of nations to establish their own governments
and to inspire a love of free ones, but afford no aid in guarding our Republican
charters against constructive violations."
As to Milton, none of the so-called Founding Fathers, to my knowledge, ever even
so much as mention him, with the single exception of John Adams, and then only
to repudiate him. In a letter to Samuel Adams he says "By the republican form,
I know you do not mean the plan of Milton, Nedham, or Turgot. For after a fair
trial of its miseries, the simple monarchial form will be, as it has ever been, preferred to it by mankind." This statement in itself is a fair comment on the thesis
most thoroughly adverse to the one maintained by Judge Ives throughout the pages
of The Ark and the Dove, viz., the assumption that the compact theory upon which
our Constitution is founded derives from the Mayflower Compact and the New
England Church covenants. Stated in the words of the ablest exponent of this
assumption, Andrew C. McLaughlin, in his book, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism,5 it amounts to this
It is necessary now to do something in the way of demonstrating the truth of
my assertions concerning the prevalence of the idea of compact, especially among
the New Englanders, whose thinking in politics and religion, in church polity and
theology, was so distinctly the thinking of seventeenth-century Puritanism. The
philosophy underlying the Puritan revolt against Charles I and the philosophy of
the American Revolution were similar; we may indeed say essentially identical [sk]
in character. But this similarity is not enough to satisfy us. An unbroken line of
descent can be traced. And the tracing of this line is advisable if we wish to see
our indebtedness to the past and how firmly fixed were certain fundamental notions
concerning the organization of a state and the establishment of its institutions.
The one fundamental difficulty about this thesis is that politics and religion without philosophy make poor bed fellows. And the history of New England as of
Protestantism generally is a clear instance in point. Beginning with Aristotle and
taken up again by St. Thomas and the great scholastics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who followed him, it was clearly discerned that the state is a
0
natural institution founded in the social nature of man. In the words of Burke, who
can always be counted on to give scholastic teaching in such connections its most
practical rendering, "He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed
also the necessary means of its perfection.-He willed therefore the state-He willed
its connection with the source and original archetype of all perfection." But the
Church has no such foundations in natural law. As a perfect society distinct from
the state it is either a divine positive institution or it has no rightful claim to exist.
Hence, when Cartwright and the Separatists in England and the Puritans of New
England, attempted to organize their covenants on the basis of Aristotle (cf. Scott
Pearson, Church and State7 ) they only succeed in eliminating the true solid foundations of the state in natural law. Both the state and the churches became merely
artificial and purely human associations without any ulterior grounds for authority
beyond the bare opinion or will of their individualistic members.
How far this falls short of the fundamental principles presupposed and implicit
in our Constitution is a matter for the fair minded to ascertain for themselves. In
our mind it leaves Judge Ives' historical account and philosophical claims decidedly
5. P. 6S.
6. 4 Bu=xz's WoaRs (World's Classics ed.) 107.
7. Pp. 133-147.
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open, to say the least, to the serious consideration of those in quest of a more adcquate and intelligible grasp of the sound principles of a Constitution which above all
else has made us the nation that we are.
MooRnousE F. X. MnLAR, S.J.f

CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS. By Albert M. Kales. Second Edition. By Horace E.

Whiteside.

St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936.

pp. xvi, 781.

$5.50.

Casebooks, as such, are not very juicy morsels. Their perusal is not likely to
envelop the epicure in raptures of ecstasy. Even the cloistered scholar struggles
valiantly to stifle a yawn. But a casebook on Future Interests defies tradition, for here
is embosomed the story of the most bitter, the most unrelenting legalistic controversy in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Here is a tournament ground
where many a brave lance has been shattered into fragments.
The coveted prize has been properly unfettered by restraints upon alienation. The
struggle had its genesis in man's insatiable desire for power-power that transcends
the present and reaches deep into the future. Not content with an autonomous control
over the fruits of his labors during life, man has sought assurance that his influence
would be felt long after his remains had been laid to rest in the ancestral tomb. This
spectre of the dead hand molding the destinies of the living has played no piddling
part in the battle of wits whence springs much of the complexity of the modern
law of property. It was this spectre also that brought recognition of the need for a
rule against perpetuities-a rule which would confine posthumous control of property
within bounds consistent with a dynamic social and economic policy.
The area of combat has been wide. While the feudal system of land tenure was
still in its formative stage landowners devised schemes to split their ownership into
"chronologically successive segments." These efforts were generative of such future
interests as reversions, possibilities of 'reverter, powers of termination, and a variety
of remainders. When, moreover, the ingenious artistry of the clergy fashioned the
"use", the power of the feudal barons was augmented by the creation of springing
uses, shifting uses and powers of appointment. The tenacious efforts of the aristocracy
to establish indestructible family settlements through these devices met with the determined resistance of the courts. Neither side hesitated to camouflage its manoeuvers
with cobwebs of sophistry. It had been adjudicated as early as 1225 that a conveyance
"to A and his heirs" gave the heirs no rights and A could effectively convey the fee. 1
When the lords attempted to evade this doctrine by the conveyance "to A and the heirs
of his body," the courts countered with the retort that such a conveyance created a
fee simple in A conditional upon the birth of issue, and that if A had issue he could
transfer the absolute fee.2 Violently indignant at this bit of judicial cunning, the
landowners enlisted the aid of a sympathetic parliament and procured the passage of
the Statute De Donis3 which, by divesting the donee under such a grant of the right
of alienation, created a new species of estate-the estate tail.
This stunned the courts into temporary submission. But when the landowners
tried to escape the rule that a conveyance "to A and his heirs" transfers a fee
simple absolute to A, by expressly restricting A's interest to a life estate through
f Head of Department of Political Philosophy and the Social Sciences of the Fordham
University Graduate School. Co-author, TnE STATE AND TE CnURC (1924).
1. D'Arundel's Case, Bracton N. B. 1054.
2. Co. Lrrr. *19a.
3.

13 EDw. I, c.1 (1285).
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conveyances reading, "to A for life and then to his heirs," the courts retaliated with
the doctrine known as the Rule in Shelley's Case which cast aside the restriction and
gave the entire fee to A. 4 The courts would not rest content, however, as long
as estates tail retained their vigor. An effective curb on these estates was finally
found in the fictional device of the common recovery whereby the tenant in tail was
enabled effectively to transfer the fee simple.5 Still reluctant to concede defeat,
conveyancers struck back with the plan of annexing to a conveyance in tail a condition that if the tenant suffered a recovery the grantor or his heirs should have the
right to terminate the estate. But clever though this device undoubtedly was, it was
consigned to speedy martyrdom by decisions declaring such conditions "repugnant!*
to the nature of the estate and consequently void.0
This vibrant story and more is absorbingly told in Professor Kales' book, not by
hearsay, but by the testimony of eyewitnesses and participants-the courts themselves, talking through the medium of opinions which have become landmarks in
the law of Future Interests. The skeleton casebook which merely reprints judicial
opinions in shrunken form has an indubitable value in subjects which lend themselves to such simple treatment. In the field of Future Interests, however, much
commentary and an abundance of explanatory and illustrative matter is esential
to the presentation of a clear and comprehensive picture. His deep appreciation
of this need prompted Professor Kales to include frequent introductory notes and
excerpts from the rich writings of such authoritative commentators as Gray, Leake
and Williams. In the preparation of the second edition, Professor Whiteside has
carried this approach into the footnotes which leave no source of supplementary
Constant reference to articles and students' notes in law
material untapped.
reviews gives ready access to a vast storehouse of advanced critical literature, illuminating many a darksome crevice in the complicated network of the law of property.
In shifting the emphasis from older cases to those of more recent date, moreover,
Professor Whiteside has enhanced considerably the value of the book, viewed from
the vantage point of pedagogy. Selectivity of this sort is of incalculable aid to the
student who too often is unnecessarily befogged by the obsolete and obsolescent
terminology characteristic of the opinions of the medieval courts. Students are sufficiently perplexed by the retention in the legal lexicon of numerous terms which
do not express the meaning they are intended to convey, without subjecting them
to the ordeal of wading, or, as is more frequently the case, muddling through pages of
verbiage long since abandoned.
Casebooks usually seek to develop their subject in chronological sequence. This
frequently has as an unfortunate consequence the resort to cases which, though
having historical and academic interest, hardly offer working material for study and
presentation. The present work is not impervious to criticism on this ground. As
an illustration, the case which introduces the celebrated Rule in Shelley's Case is
the Provost of Beverly's Case.7 The student is rare indeed who can extract
the doctrine from this opinion. The reason for the Rule, its significance and historical function are not to be found here. The student would be less likely to
approach the subject with the customary trepidation if he were led into it by a case like
Perrin v. Blake.8 The opinion of Blackstone in the Court of Exchequer Chamber
4. Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. 88b, 104a, 76 Eng. Reprints 199, 234 (1581).
5. Taltarum's Case, Y. B. 12 Eaw. IV, 19 (1472).
6. Cholmeley v. Humble, 1 Anderson 346, 123 Eng. Reprints 509 (C.P. 1594) ; Germin v.
Ascot, Moore K.B. 364, 72 Eng. Reprints 631 (K.B. 1595).
7. Y.B. 40 EDw. 111, 9 (1367).
8. HARRAovx's LAw TRAcrs 407, 10 Eng. Ruling Cases 689 (1772).
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is a veritable example of a unique combination of lucidity and depth. An abridgment
of this opinion to fit the space limitations of a casebook would furnish the student
with a genuine opportunity to really grasp the meaning of the Rule.
The section dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities has an especially timely
interest to students and practitioners in New York. Since the abrogation of the
common law rule more than a hundred years ago, and the erection of a statutory
system to replace it, the precise content of the New York Rule Against Perpetuities
has been a dark mystery. Much of the confusion has resulted from the inadequacy
of the rule restricting the suspension of the power of alienation or the postponement
of vesting to a period of two lives, supplemented by a possible minority. When
called upon to relieve against the rigors of this arbitrary doctrine, the courts
responded valiantly. A refusal to become enthusiastic over the product of their
labors, however, is pardonable. In their effort to evade the pitfalls of the statutory
system, the courts have plunged headlong into a conceptual system of labyrinthine
complexity. Scores of constructional devices and instruments of judicial surgery
have created an enormous amount of learning deposited in a vault to which no
one possesses the combination. Even the poet has been moved to complain:
"The law of perpetuities

Is strewn with technicalities
Its crotchets and circuities
Exhaust the best mentalities,
It involutes inanities,
The meshes which immure it, tease
The lips to pour profanities
Upon its dark obscurities
Its maddening profundities
Wake murderous propensities.
However sage the pundit, he's
Befuddled by its densities
Congeries of quiddities
That tax the ingenuities-Such are those drear aridities,
The rules of perpetuities."'
Dissatisfaction with this state of things is widespread. By slow stages lawyers
are enlisting in the movement to weave the fabric into a pattern of less intricate
design. To this end the Law Revision Commission has undertaken to investigate
the subject and has prepared, through Professors Powell of Columbia and Whiteside
of Cornell, a valuable study which throws a powerful spotlight upon the stubborn
issues. A tentative bill has been drafted but its immediate adoption is not recommended because of the all too obvious need for careful deliberation and guarded
advance in this most thorny field. It is in this connection that Professor Kales'
casebook can be of real help. A major change suggested by the Commission centers
about the abrogation of the arbitrary two lives limit and the substitution of a rule
whereby the permissible period for the suspension of the power of alienation or
the postponement of vesting would be no longer than for
'"1. the continuance of lives of persons then in being together with the minorities of
persons in being at the end of such measuring lives, and one or more actual periods of
gestation; or, in the alternative,
2. twenty-one years. In no case shall the lives or minorities measuring this permissible
period be so designated or so numerous as to make probf of their end unreasonably difficult."10

These alternatives
will be recognized as similar to the common law period. No evalu1
9. Axiphiles, Conning Tower, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 29, 1931, at p. 19.
10. Communication and Study Relating to Rule Against Perpetuities, LEwos. Doe. No.
65 (H) (1936) 13.
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ation of the recommended change can be adequate which fails to compare the functioning of the Rule Against Perpetuities at common law with its operation under the
statutory two lives rule. This casebook offers an excellent opportunity for a study
of the contrast, for here is reprinted an abundance of cases, from common law jurisdictions together with the leading New York cases. When both groups of cases have
been studied and pondered, it is difficult to come away with any great reverence for the
statutory system now operative in New York.
Rules of construction, we are told, have potency varying with the judges who apply them;"1 but however variable their force, they must still be reckoned with as
important factors in the judicial process. Some rules of construction have become
so firmly fixed as to have acquired definite and commanding authority. Usually
students are left to pick these rules off the hedges as they hurry up the road. But
the compiler of this casebook is convinced that "only by a study of the results of numerous decisions by different judges, in different jurisdictions and under varying
circumstances and conditions as to time, can the student acquire familiarity vth the
interpretive process."' '
The result is an excellent collection of cases dealing with
the construction of limitations most frequently employed in modem trust schemes.
The practitioner as well as the student can profit by their study.
Future Interests is a subject which must constantly expand to meet the needs
,of advancing generations. New types of settlements and trusts are constantly
being shaped by the demands of a commercial age. Acquaintance with the heritage
of the past is indispensable to the proper understanding of these instruments of the
present and future. Here in one book are assembled the cases which constitute this
heritage.
JULIUS APPELAZMt

TE Nmn OLD MEN. By Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen.
day, Doran & Company. 1936. pp. 325. $2.50.

New York: Double-

This is a New Deal book of the "smear 'em" type. The nine old men are the
members of the United States Supreme Court. The Court has ruled against the
New Deal, and, that it may be deterred from repeating the offence, it must be
"smeared." No responsible official of the executive department ventured, during
the recent presidential campaign, to ridicule the Supreme Court of the United States
as it is ridiculed in this book.
The book is written in the lively newspaper style, and some real information is
conveyed to the reader about the XIV Amendment. The story of the Schecter
case is well told.
How much reliance can be placed in the statements of fact contained in this book,
it is not easy to determine. The authors call Roscoe Conkling a "famous Tammany
politician,"' while it is a matter of record that he was a Republican, having been
elected to the United States Senate on the Republican ticket. The authors declare
that when Brewer was placed on the Supreme Court, his uncle, Stephen J. Field,
had two votes.2 Yet Swisher in Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Law,0 declares
that Brewer "was averse to being led" by his uncle, and that "on more than one
11. KALEs, CAsrS o.N Funmn L-nmrs (2d ed. 1936) 195.
Ibid.
ember of the New York Bar. Former Editor-in-Chief, FoRuAMs

12.

1. P. 69.
2. P. 68.
3. Swr-"a. , STrmaa,

J. Fi=n, CRA rsr.,r or nm L.tw (1930) 438.

L v., Rmvuw.
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occasion the two men clashed heavily
in their decisions."
The authors have Polk
4
assuming the Presidency in 1856.
Here is a startling statement: "Four times during the debates in Philadelphia
on June 5th and 6th, July 21st and August 15th James Madison and James Wilson,
the latter to become Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, proposed that the
Constitution contain a provision giving the Judiciary the right to pass on the constitutionality of Acts of Congress, and5 four times the proposal was rejected. Never
did it receive more than three votes."
This statement would be interesting, if true. Is it true?
Just what was the problem before the Constitutional Convention on the dates
mentioned? Was the power of the Supreme Court to declare an Act of Congress
unconstitutional or was some other power under discussion?
Charles Warren, in The Making of the Constitution,( writes:
"In Randolph's original Resolution there was. a provision for joining the Judiciary
with the Executive in this power to reject Acts of the National Legislature. The
grant to the Judiciary of such a function was now defeated on this day (June 4th,
1877), and three renewals of this proposal on June 6, July 21 and August 15 were
likewise defeated. The general opinion of the delegates was that it was improper
to join the Judges in this veto power, since the constitutionality of an Act of Congress might come up before them later in their judicial capacity, and they ought not
be given an opportunity to pass twice on such an Act, once in a legislative or executive capacity, and once judicially."
On July 21st the Resolution was adopted to grant to the President the power to
veto any Act of Congress which Act could be repassed over the President's veto
by a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress. 7
It thus appears from Warren that the Resolution to grant to the Supreme Court
the power to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional was never rejected by
the Convention, because it was never before the Convention. What was rejected
was the proposal to unite the Supreme Court with the President in vetoing Acts of
Congress, which could again be passed by a two-thirds majority of each House.
The reason for rejecting the Resolution is interesting: The Supreme Court should
not be empowered to pass twice on Acts of Congress. It was apparently assumed
by the Convention that, without any special grant of power, the Supreme Court
could pass on the constitutionality of Acts of Congress, when the constitutionality
was an issue in a case before the Court.
When the authors make so many errors in matters of public record, what reliance
can be placed in their report of back-stairs gossip?
But worse than the substance is the tone of the book. It aims to make the
United States Supreme Court look ridiculous.
The ancient Hebrews had so great reverence for the Divinity that they would not
presume to pronounce His name. Their rulers, as representatives of the Divinity,
shared in this reverence. It was a wholesome attitude of mind. If there is to be
law, there must be authority. And if the authority is to be obeyed, it must be
respected. Revolt is the sequel to contempt for authority. This book aims to
arouse contempt for the highest judicial body in this country. In tendency, it is
pronouncedly anarchistic. Are the authors anarchists, or have they merely carried
with them into maturity the bad manners of an ugly childhood?
JOHN X. PYNE, S.J.i
4.

P. 57.

5. P. 48.
6. VARR- N, THE MAm0NG
7. Id. at 454.

Or THE CoNsniTunioN

(1929) 186, 187.

t Regent, Fordhan University, School of Law. Author, TnE MIN (1925).
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LW OF SALES. By George G. Bogert and William E.
Britton. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1936, pp. xxv, 1171. 7.0D.
One cannot be sure that he has fairly appraised a casebook after such an exmmination as a reviewer is apt to have the opportunity to make, especially if the book
contains a considerable proportion of cases which he has not previously used in the
classroom. It is only after the book has been thoroughly studied, as though in
preparation for the classroom, that its merits and shortcomings will fully appear.
The great work, however, which has been done by the editors of this new casebook in the field of Sales and their reputation for scholarship make it certain that
this book has been soundly done.
The editors disclaim any intention to present a novel arrangement of cases. Nevertheless, the order of development which they have chosen is, it seems to this reviewer,
better than that in other casebooks on Sales with which he is familiar. The chapter
devoted to the transfer of the property rights in goods, for example, opens with cases
dealing with goods which were ascertained at the time of the bargain and then,
after a short section devoted to the general rule when the goods were not so ascertained, it proceeds to the topics of fungible goods and goods "potentially" possessed.
The doctrine of appropriation is then taken up and the chapter closes with a section devoted to sales on approval, or return and "cash" sales. The materials on
estoppel, purchases from fraudulent vendees, the Factors' Acts, and retention of
possession by the seller are included in a chapter which precedes the one on documents of title on the ground that the materials dealing with the acquisition of property rights by third persons will aid to a better understanding of the bill of lading
cases. The remedies of the buyer are considered immediately after the chapter on
the seller's liabilities under the warranties. The seller's remedies come last.
This order of development should make the book very teachable inasmuch as
the student acquires, as he goes along, the principles and rules which will enable him
to explore nearly every angle of each succeeding case. The instructor, probably,
seldom will be obliged to say: "That is a point which we will meet with later on
where it is more clearly developed." Of course the seller's action for the price as
contrasted with his action for damages is bound to pop up at the very beginning in
the cases dealing with the transfer of the property rights, but this difficulty is
inherent in the subject of Sales and no one would propose placing the cases on the
seller's remedies in first place.
The editors state that "recent American cases are favored over the older English
decisions." As the examiner leafs through the book he will indeed be struck by the
absence of some of the landmark cases from the English courts or will be disappointed perhaps to find them only curtly mentioned in the footnotes.1 This
emphasis on recent American cases does not seem to the reviewer to be of any particular advantage. There is no especial merit in a case, of course, because it is
recent. The older English cases, after all, provide the foundation upon which the
present law of Sales is built, both in its statute and case form. The court in the
classic case usually was approaching a problem presented for the first time and
without the aid of statute. It therefore felt called upon to state at large its reasons
for the rule adopted. On the other hand, the court in the recent American case on
the same point is deciding the case and writing its opinion against the background
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE

1.

For example: Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 759, 128 Eng. Reprints 890 (C. P. 1814),

omitted. Bethell and Co. v. CIark and Co., 20 Q. B. D. 615 (1888), omitted. Hanson v.
Meyer, 6 East 614, 102 Eng. Reprints 1425 (K. B. 1805); Woods v. RusselI, 5 B. & Aid.
942, 106 Eng. Reprints 1436 (K. B. 1822); Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 E. & B. 885, 119 Eng.
Reprints 1476 (Q. B. 1857), and Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868) are in footnotes.
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of the earlier decisions and with the aid of statute. It is not apt to go so fully
into the matter as its progenitor and the opinion will not be so useful for class
discussion. In a few instances, also, recent American cases are preferred by the
editors to older cases decided on this side of the water which, to the mind of the
writer, are more satisfactory for instructional purposes. 2 The cases selected, however, are all interesting and develop the subject of Sales thoroughly. No doubt
upon more familiar acquaintance the more recent cases will become just as good
friends as some of the old companions.
This casebook contains one thousand and eighty-two pages of case material.
The editors, realizing that in many law schools time limitations will not permit a
complete coverage of the cases included, have prepared a list of cases which may
be omitted. This list includes eighty-eight cases covering a space of two hundred
and ninety-nine pages, thus reducing the content to be covered to about eight hundred pages. Assignment of the remaining cases, they state, will give the student an
acquaintance with the whole range of topics in the book, with the exception of
the first chapter which deals principally with the Statute of Frauds.
The appendix is more than usually useful. The Sale of Goods Act, the Uniform
Sales Act and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act are ificluded, as is customary.
Included also are the Uniform Bills of Lading, Warehouse Receipts and Trust
Receipts Acts, as well as the New York Factors' Act and the New York Bulk Sales
Act. The footnotes, besides containing excerpts from important cases and occasional
suggestive questions, give references to useful materials to be found in the law
reviews.
GEORGE W. BACON.1'

THE SALE oF FOOD AND DRINK AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES
AcT. By Harry C. W. Melick. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1936. pp. xlii, 346.

$5.00.
A branch of the law of Sales of great interest and of practical importance is the
law of warranty in relation to the sale of food and drink. Mr. Melick has chosen
this segment of the law for investigation and has produced an admirable and useful
study. He has made a very comprehensive survey of English and American cases,
of textual writings on the subject and of articles and notes in the law reviews. It
seems that hardly a case on the subject has escaped his vigilant eye. About seven
hundred cases are cited and nearly a hundred of the important ones are abstracted
and commented upon at length.
The author traces the origin of the modem law back to statutes of a penal nature
adopted in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He discusses the
rules that prevailed at common law, which were in some respects more favorable to
the injured buyer than is the case under the Sales Act today, at least in New York,
and takes up in detail the application of the implied warranty of fitness as defined
in the Sales Act. Leading cases from most of the states of the Union are studied.
The liabilities as between dealers, the retailer's liability for food in sealed containers, the rule as to defective containers and the divergent views of the courts on
the question of privity are dealt with in separate chapters. There then follow
chapters on the liability of innkeepers and restaurateurs, on the husband's right of
2. Green v. Wachs, 254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930) for example, is placed In the
text and Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882) is appended as a footnote. MeElwee v.
Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302 (1895) is brought down to the footnotes.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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action for loss of consortium where the wife is the purchaser, on the applicable law
of negligence and on the rule of damages.
It is the author's practice to set out the facts of the leading cases and to state
the gist of the courts' opinions. In many cases the author has added important
facts which he has found in the trial record but which are missing from the courts'
statements. The author then adds his own comment. This comment is penetrating; cases are contrasted with one another; an effort is made to explain apparent
inconsistencies and when the cases are irreconcilable the author suggests which are
to be preferred together with his reasons. The book distinctly is not a mere paste
pot and scissors compendium of cases.
In the chapters on the much debated question as to whether or not the implied
warranty of fitness runs to the benefit of the ultimate consumer as against the manufacturer when there is no privity of contract the author advocates adoption of the
third party beneficiary doctrine. This was apparently adopted in the Ohio case
1
of Ward Baking Co. v. Trizziyw, in which the retail purchaser recovered against the
manufacturer. Whether or not the result reached in that case is desirable from
the standpoint of social policy the reviewer does not undertake to say, but be is of
the opinion that the result cannot be soundly reached under the third party beneficiary doctrine. It is of the essence of that doctrine, he believes, that the parties
to the contract of which the plaintiff claims the benefit intend that the promisor
shall assume a duty to the beneficiary. That the manufacturer, in his contract with
the retailer, intends and undertakes to be answerable for breaches of implied warranty to the ultimate consumer can hardly be claimed.
This book will save the busy lawyer a great deal of time in research and will be
of interest and value to the more cloistered student and teacher.
GEORGE W. BACON.t

BOOKS RECEIVED
A number of the books listed below will be reviewed in the May issue of
the FoRDH=AI LAW REviEw.
CASES AND OTHER MTATERIALs ON CONFLICT Or LAWS. By Elliott E. Cheatham,
Noel T. Dowling and Herbert F. Goodrich. Chicago: Foundation Press, Inc. 1936.
pp. xliv, 1148. $7.00.
CASES ON CREDIT TRANSACTIONS. By Wesley A. Sturges. Second Edition. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xiii, 1082. $6.50.
CASES ON EQurry. By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
1936. pp. =dv, 1286. $6.00.
CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Manley 0. Hudson. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xl, 1440, $6.50.
CASES ON TRADE REGULATION. By S. Chesterfield Oppenheim. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co. 1936. pp. lii, 1518. $6.50.
CASES ON TIALs, JUDGaZENTS AND APPEALS. By Thurman W. Arnold and Fleming James, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xxvii, 869. $6.00.
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928).
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1.
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By Harold R. Medina, Edward Q. Carr and John F.

X. Finn. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936.

pp. viii, 719.

$5.00.

By Samuel W. Eager. Albany: Matthew Bender &
Co. 1936. pp. xiii, 289. $5.00.
EQUITY. By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp.
xix, 421. $5.00.
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. His Book Notices and Uncollected Papers.
By Harry C. Shriver. New York: Central Book Co. 1936. pp. xii, 280. $3.00.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY. B'y the American Law Institute. St.
Paul: American Law Institute Publishers. 1936. pp. Part I: lxi, 503; Part II:
liii, 505-1179. $12.00.
ZONING.
By Edward M. Bassett. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1936.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.

pp. 275. $3.00.

